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Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population…
This paper investigates a fully distributed adaptive Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking algorithm for constrained noncooperative games with prescribed-time stability. On the one hand, prescribed-time stability for the proposed NE seeking…
This work examines a stochastic formulation of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) where agents are subject to randomness in the environment of unknown statistical distribution. We focus on fully-distributed online learning by…
We study the generalized linear bandit (GLB) problem, a contextual multi-armed bandit framework that extends the classical linear model by incorporating a non-linear link function, thereby modeling a broad class of reward distributions such…
Policy optimization, which finds the desired policy by maximizing value functions via optimization techniques, lies at the heart of reinforcement learning (RL). In addition to value maximization, other practical considerations arise as…
We consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a general-sum game, where player $i$'s objective is $f_i(x)=f_i(x_1,...,x_n)$, with $x_j\in\mathbb{R}^{d_j}$ denoting the strategy variables of player $j$. Our focus is on…
We consider the problem of computing a mixed-strategy generalized Nash equilibrium (MS-GNE) for a class of games where each agent has both continuous and integer decision variables. Specifically, we propose a novel Bregman…
Many economic games and machine learning approaches can be cast as competitive optimization problems where multiple agents are minimizing their respective objective function, which depends on all agents' actions. While gradient descent is a…
Learning stationary policies in infinite-horizon general-sum Markov games (MGs) remains a fundamental open problem in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). While stationary strategies are preferred for their practicality, computing…
We study the problem of finding the Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum Markov game. Due to its formulation as a minimax optimization program, a natural approach to solve the problem is to perform gradient descent/ascent with respect…
Gradient temporal-difference (GTD) learning algorithms are widely used for off-policy policy evaluation with function approximation. However, existing convergence analyses rely on the restrictive assumption that the so-called feature…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…
We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity…
We present a general computational framework for solving continuous-time financial market equilibria under minimal modeling assumptions while incorporating realistic financial frictions, such as trading costs, and supporting multiple…
Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…
Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences is inherently multi-objective: different users and evaluation criteria impose heterogeneous and often conflicting requirements on model outputs. We propose CAGE (Common-Agency…
Iterative alignment methods based on purely greedy updates are remarkably effective in practice, yet existing theoretical guarantees of \(O(\log T)\) KL-regularized regret can seem pessimistic relative to their empirical performance. In…
The statistical framework of Generalized Linear Models (GLM) can be applied to sequential problems involving categorical or ordinal rewards associated, for instance, with clicks, likes or ratings. In the example of binary rewards, logistic…
This paper investigates online stochastic aggregative games subject to local set constraints and time-varying coupled inequality constraints, where each player possesses a time-varying expectation-valued cost function relying on not only…