Related papers: Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for MMS Approxi…
We explore the fair distribution of a set of $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents, where each agent's costs are evaluated using a monotone cost function. Our focus lies on two fairness criteria: envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and a…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents, where each agent's valuation is fractionally subadditive (XOS). With respect to AnyPrice Share (APS) fairness, Kulkarni et al. (2024) showed that, when agents have…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open…
We study the two-agent single-item bilateral trade. Ideally, the trade should happen whenever the buyer's value for the item exceeds the seller's cost. However, the classical result of Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that no mechanism can…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
Submodular over signal (SOS) defines a family of interesting functions for which there exist truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with interdependent valuations. The best-known truthful auction is…
We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a…
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (A-CEEI) is an equilibrium-based solution concept for fair division of discrete items to agents with combinatorial demands. In theory, it is known that in asymptotically large markets:…
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn from a…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
We present a unified framework for designing deterministic monotone polynomial time approximation schemes (PTAS's) for a wide class of scheduling problems on uniformly related machines. This class includes (among others) minimizing the…
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The…
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…
We consider fair allocations of indivisible goods to agents with general monotone valuations. We observe that it is useful to introduce a new share-based fairness notion, the {\em residual maximin share} (RMMS). This share is {\em feasible}…
Randomized rankings have been of recent interest to achieve ex-ante fairer exposure and better robustness than deterministic rankings. We propose a set of natural axioms for randomized group-fair rankings and prove that there exists a…
We study envy-free allocations of indivisible goods to agents in settings where each agent is unaware of the goods allocated to other agents. In particular, we propose the maximin aware (MMA) fairness measure, which guarantees that every…
We study the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with heterogeneous additive valuations, subject to lower and upper quotas on the number of items allocated to each agent. Such constraints are crucial in various applications,…