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One of the main results shown through Roughgarden's notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria coincides with…

This paper considers convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their own cost functions using locally available information. A common assumption in the study of such games is that the agents are symmetric, meaning that…

Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses, and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so on.…

Shuffling gradient methods are widely used in modern machine learning tasks and include three popular implementations: Random Reshuffle (RR), Shuffle Once (SO), and Incremental Gradient (IG). Compared to the empirical success, the…

We propose locally convergent Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms for $N$-player noncooperative games, which use distributed event-triggered pseudo-gradient estimates. The proposed approach employs sinusoidal perturbations to estimate the…

In everyday life, we frequently make coarse-grained judgments. When we say that Olivia and Noah excel in mathematics, we disregard the specific differences in their mathematical abilities. Similarly, when we claim that a particular…

Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we…

We present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria in a broad class of constraint satisfaction games that generalize the well-known cut and party affiliation games. Our results improve previous ones by Bhalgat et al.~(EC…

We consider differentiable games where the goal is to find a Nash equilibrium. The machine learning community has recently started using variants of the gradient method (GD). Prime examples are extragradient (EG), the optimistic gradient…

As quantum processors advance, the emergence of large-scale decentralized systems involving interacting quantum-enabled agents is on the horizon. Recent research efforts have explored quantum versions of Nash and correlated equilibria as…

Finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information are difficult because actions both move payoffs and reshape what opponents learn, generating hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs. This paper provides a recursive representation…

We revisit the problem of learning in two-player zero-sum Markov games, focusing on developing an algorithm that is uncoupled, convergent, and rational, with non-asymptotic convergence rates. We start from the case of stateless matrix game…

Policy gradient methods have become a staple of any single-agent reinforcement learning toolbox, due to their combination of desirable properties: iterate convergence, efficient use of stochastic trajectory feedback, and theoretically-sound…

There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…

We study deterministic optimal control problems for differential games with finite horizon. We propose new approximations of the strategies in feedback form, and show error estimates and a convergence result of the value in some weak sense…

In this work, we study the sample complexity of obtaining a Nash equilibrium (NE) estimate in two-player zero-sum matrix games with noisy feedback. Specifically, we propose a novel algorithm that repeatedly solves linear programs (LPs) to…

We construct Nash-equilibria in mean-field portfolio games of optimal investment and hedging under relative performance concerns with exponential (CARA) utility preferences. Common noise dynamics are modeled by integer-valued random…

To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the…