Related papers: Can a Weaker Player Win? Adaptive Play in Repeated…

We analyze the dynamics of competitions with a large number of players. In our model, n players compete against each other and the winner is decided based on the standings: in each competition, the mth ranked player wins. We solve for the…

We study a random game in which two players in turn play a fixed number of moves. For each move, there are two possible choices. To each possible outcome of the game we assign a winner in an i.i.d. fashion with a fixed parameter p. In the…

A checkers-like model game with a simplified set of rules is studied through extensive simulations of agents with different expertise and strategies. The introduction of complementary strategies, in a quite general way, provides a tool to…

We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space…

We analyze a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competing players who can choose unbounded controls. The payoffs of the game are defined through backward stochastic differential equations. We prove that each player's priority…

Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…

An important feature of a dynamic game is its monitoring structure namely, what the players effectively see from the played actions. We consider games with arbitrary monitoring structures. One of the purposes of this paper is to know to…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…

There are $n$ independent Bernoulli random variables with parameters $p_i$ that are observed sequentially. Two players, A and B, act in turns starting with player A. Each player has the possibility on his turn, when $I_k=1$, to choose…

A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…

We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing…

An adaptive controller with bounded l2-gain from disturbances to errors is derived for linear time-invariant systems with uncertain parameters restricted to a finite set. The gain bound refers to the closed loop system, including the…

The recent advancement in real-world critical infrastructure networks has led to an exponential growth in the use of automated devices which in turn has created new security challenges. In this paper, we study the robust and adaptive…

This paper studies a language-based opacity enforcement in a two-player, zero-sum game on a graph. In this game, player 1 (P1) wins if it can achieve a secret temporal goal described by the language of a finite automaton, no matter what…

We compare games under delayed control and delay games, two types of infinite games modelling asynchronicity in reactive synthesis. In games under delayed control both players suffer from partial informedness due to symmetrically delayed…

Consider the following probabilistic one-player game: The board is a graph with $n$ vertices, which initially contains no edges. In each step, a new edge is drawn uniformly at random from all non-edges and is presented to the player,…

In this work, we consider classification of agents who can both game and improve. For example, people wishing to get a loan may be able to take some actions that increase their perceived credit-worthiness and others that also increase their…

Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…

We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…