Related papers: An Online Learning Approach for Two-Player Zero-Su…
The paper is concerned with two-person zero-sum mean-field linear-quadratic stochastic differential games over finite horizons. By a Hilbert space method, a necessary condition and a sufficient condition are derived for the existence of an…
Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm…
Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)…
The paper studies the open-loop saddle point and the open-loop lower and upper values, as well as their relationship for two-person zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) differential games with deterministic coefficients. It…
We study the problem of controlling linear time-invariant systems with known noisy dynamics and adversarially chosen quadratic losses. We present the first efficient online learning algorithms in this setting that guarantee $O(\sqrt{T})$…
Game theory provides essential analysis in many applications of strategic interactions. However, the question of how to construct a game model and what is its fidelity is seldom addressed. In this work, we consider learning in a class of…
We introduce an online learning algorithm in the bandit feedback model that, once adopted by all agents of a congestion game, results in game-dynamics that converge to an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash Equilibrium in a polynomial number of…
We propose a novel online learning method for minimizing regret in large extensive-form games. The approach learns a function approximator online to estimate the regret for choosing a particular action. A no-regret algorithm uses these…
Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss. However, powerful RL optimizers inevitably exploit minor model inaccuracies, leading to simulator exploitation and a reality gap…
In this paper, we consider a distributed learning problem in a subnetwork zero-sum game, where agents are competing in different subnetworks. These agents are connected through time-varying graphs where each agent has its own cost function…
We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…
Non-cooperative games serve as a powerful framework for capturing the interactions among self-interested players and have broad applicability in modeling a wide range of practical scenarios, ranging from power management to drug delivery.…
We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow…
While ERM suffices to attain near-optimal generalization error in the stochastic learning setting, this is not known to be the case in the online learning setting, where algorithms for general concept classes rely on computationally…
Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…
This paper studies the optimistic variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a regularized algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this…
In this paper, we propose Posterior Sampling Reinforcement Learning for Zero-sum Stochastic Games (PSRL-ZSG), the first online learning algorithm that achieves Bayesian regret bound of $O(HS\sqrt{AT})$ in the infinite-horizon zero-sum…
Zero-sum Linear Quadratic (LQ) games are fundamental in optimal control and can be used (i)~as a dynamic game formulation for risk-sensitive or robust control and (ii)~as a benchmark setting for multi-agent reinforcement learning with two…
We introduce a new algorithm for online linear-quadratic control in a known system subject to adversarial disturbances. Existing regret bounds for this setting scale as $\sqrt{T}$ unless strong stochastic assumptions are imposed on the…
Online learning in arbitrary, and possibly adversarial, environments has been extensively studied in sequential decision-making, and it is closely connected to equilibrium computation in game theory. Most existing online learning algorithms…