Related papers: Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference…
We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the profit of a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget utilization preferences of the DSP's advertiser clients are adequately met. Our model is highly flexible and can be…
This study develops a strategic procurement framework integrating blockchain-based smart contracts with bounded demand variability modeled through a truncated normal distribution. While existing research emphasizes the technical feasibility…
In this paper, we construct a decentralized clearing mechanism which endogenously and automatically provides a claims resolution procedure. This mechanism can be used to clear a network of obligations through blockchain. In particular, we…
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [American Economic Review, 2017], strengthens the well-known…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
Training large language models (LLMs) requires vast amounts of high-quality data from institutions that face legal, privacy, and strategic constraints. Existing data procurement methods often rely on unverifiable trust or ignore…
Auction has been used to allocate resources or tasks to processes, machines or other autonomous entities in distributed systems. When different bidders have different demands and valuations on different types of resources or tasks, the…
This paper investigates how pricing schemes can achieve efficient allocations in blockchain systems featuring multiple transaction queues under a global capacity constraint. I model a capacity-constrained blockchain where users submit…
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…
Accurate attribution for multiple platforms is critical for evaluating performance-based advertising. However, existing attribution methods rely heavily on the heuristic methods, e.g., Last-Click Mechanism (LCM) which always allocates the…
We consider a general multi-connectivity framework, intended for ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) services, and propose a novel, preallocation-based combinatorial auction approach for the efficient allocation of channels.…
Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study optimal selling mechanisms for dynamic markets with stochastic supply and demand. In our model, buyers with private valuations and…
In online auctions, fraudulent behaviors such as shill bidding pose significant risks. This paper presents a conceptual framework that applies dynamic, behavior-based penalties to deter auction fraud using blockchain smart contracts. Unlike…
This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…
I study a repeated auction in which payments are made with a blockchain token created and initially owned by the auction designer. Unlike the ``virtual money'' previously examined in mechanism design, such tokens can be saved and traded…
Crowdsourcing has become an important tool to collect data for various artificial intelligence applications and auction can be an effective way to allocate work and determine reward in a crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on…
Recent attention on secure multiparty computation and blockchain technology has garnered new interest in developing auction protocols in a decentralized setting. In this paper, we propose a secure and private Vickrey auction protocol that…
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts the design of smart contracts, because agents may themselves deploy smart contracts (side contracts). Typically, equilibria of games are analyzed in vitro, under the assumption that players…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…