Related papers: Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
This paper concerns the mechanism design for online resource allocation in a strategic setting. In this setting, a single supplier allocates capacity-limited resources to requests that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each…
The design of optimal auctions is a problem of interest in economics, game theory and computer science. Despite decades of effort, strategyproof, revenue-maximizing auction designs are still not known outside of restricted settings.…
Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study…
Data sharing is very important for accelerating scientific research, business innovations, and for informing individuals. Yet, concerns over data privacy, cost, and lack of secure data-sharing solutions have prevented data owners from…
This paper studies a wireless network where multiple users cooperate with each other to improve the overall network performance. Our goal is to design an optimal distributed power allocation algorithm that enables user cooperation, in…
In many domains such as transportation and logistics, search and rescue, or cooperative surveillance, tasks are pending to be allocated with the consideration of possible execution uncertainties. Existing task coordination algorithms either…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
The problem of a single point of failure in centralized systems poses a great challenge to the stability of such systems. Meanwhile, the tamperability of data within centralized systems makes users reluctant to trust and use centralized…
Consensus plays a crucial role in distributed ledger systems, impacting both scalability and decentralization. Many blockchain systems use a weighted lottery based on a scarce resource such as a stake, storage, memory, or computing power to…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…
The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge…
To address the exponentially increasing data rate demands of end users, necessitates efficient spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands to cater to the temporal and spatial variations of…
The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
This dissertation addresses the challenge of ensuring transactional integrity and reducing costs in corporate governance through blockchain technology. We propose an on-chain methodology for certifying, registering, and querying…
We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multi-dimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial)…
There is only one technique for prior-free optimal mechanism design that generalizes beyond the structurally benevolent setting of digital goods. This technique uses random sampling to estimate the distribution of agent values and then…
This paper addresses the online $k$-selection problem with diseconomies of scale (OSDoS), where a seller seeks to maximize social welfare by optimally pricing items for sequentially arriving buyers, accounting for increasing marginal…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
A decentralized blockchain is a distributed ledger that is often used as a platform for exchanging goods and services. This ledger is maintained by a network of nodes that obeys a set of rules, called a consensus protocol, which helps to…