Related papers: Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
Modern blockchain applications benefit from the ability to specify sequencing constraints on the transactions that interact with them. This paper proposes a principled and axiomatically justified way of adding sequencing constraints on…
We study the impact of the order flow auction (OFA) in the context of the proposer-builder separation (PBS) mechanism in blockchains through a game-theoretic perspective. The OFA is designed to improve user welfare by redistributing maximal…
This paper propose a protocol for lottery and a protocol for auction on quantum Blockchain. Our protocol of lottery satisfies randomness, unpredictability, unforgeability, verifiability, decentralization and unconditional security. Our…
The effectiveness of advertising in e-commerce largely depends on the ability of merchants to bid on and win impressions for their targeted users. The bidding procedure is highly complex due to various factors such as market competition,…
Proof-of-work blockchains reward each miner for one completed block by an amount that is, in expectation, proportional to the number of hashes the miner contributed to the mining of the block. Is this proportional allocation rule optimal?…
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information because the agents' valuation functions are taken to be private…
Procuring agricultural inputs (agri-inputs for short) such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, at desired quality levels and at affordable cost, forms a critical component of agricultural input operations. This is a particularly…
In blockchain systems, fair transaction ordering is crucial for a trusted and regulation-compliant economic ecosystem. Unlike traditional State Machine Replication (SMR) systems, which focus solely on liveness and safety, blockchain systems…
We consider a setting where $p$ public resources are to be allocated among $n$ competing and strategic agents so as to maximize social welfare (the objects should be allocated to those who value them the most). This is called allocative…
We propose a game theoretic framework for task allocation in mobile cloud computing that corresponds to offloading of compute tasks to a group of nearby mobile devices. Specifically, in our framework, a distributor node holds a…
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…
Blockchains offer a decentralized and secure execution environment strong enough to host cryptocurrencies, but the state-replication model makes on-chain computation expensive. To avoid heavy on-chain workloads, systems like Truebit and…
We consider the optimization problem of a multi-resource, multi-unit VCG auction that produces an optimal, i.e., non-approximated, social welfare. We present an algorithm that solves this optimization problem with pseudo-polynomial…
We consider the problem of repeatedly allocating multiple shareable public goods that have limited availability in an online setting without the use of money. In our setting, agents have additive values, and the value each agent receives…
In decentralized systems, nodes often need to coordinate to access shared resources in a fair manner. One approach to perform such arbitration is to rely on auction mechanisms. Although there is an extensive literature that studies…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…
Although Bitcoin was intended to be a decentralized digital currency, in practice, mining power is quite concentrated. This fact is a persistent source of concern for the Bitcoin community. We provide an explanation using a simple model to…
We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller $i$ to effectively ``freeze'' their price while remaining active in the auction, and…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…