Related papers: Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
Traditional blockchain design gives miners or validators full control over transaction ordering, i.e., they can freely choose which transactions to include or exclude, as well as in which order. While not an issue initially, the emergence…
Many sequential decision-making tasks require satisfaction of multiple, partially contradictory objectives. Existing approaches are monolithic, namely all objectives are fulfilled using a single policy, which is a function that selects a…
In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…
We study the problem of designing optimal auctions under restrictions on the set of permissible allocations. In addition to allowing us to restrict to deterministic mechanisms, we can also indirectly model non-additive valuations. We prove…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to their centralized counterparts. Recently, off-chain…
Traditional smart grid energy auctions cannot directly be integrated in blockchain due to its decentralized nature. Therefore, research works are being carried out to propose efficient decentralized auctions for energy trading. Since,…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private…
In this work, we study the problem of online mechanism design for resources allocation and pricing in cloud computing (RAPCC). We show that in general the allocation problems in RAPCC are NP-hard, and therefore we focus on designing…
Although the iterative double auction has been widely used in many different applications, one of the major problems in its current implementations is that they rely on a trusted third party to handle the auction process. This imposes the…
We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our…
In a two-round auction, a subset of bidders is selected (probabilistically), according to their bids in the first round, for the second round, where they can increase their bids. We formalize the two-round auction model, restricting the…
In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the…
Notifications are important for the user experience in mobile apps and can influence their engagement. However, too many notifications can be disruptive for users. A typical mobile app usually has several types of notification, managed by…
We design approximate weakly group strategy-proof mechanisms for resource reallocation problems using Milgrom and Segal's deferred acceptance auction framework: the radio spectrum and network bandwidth reallocation problems in the…
We study a general online combinatorial auction problem in algorithmic mechanism design. A provider allocates multiple types of capacity-limited resources to customers that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each customer has a…
With the rise of smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged in public good auctions, allowing "small" bidders to gather together and enlarge their influence in high-valued auctions. However, models and…
We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing…
Consensus protocols used today in blockchains often rely on computational power or financial stakes - scarce resources. We propose a novel protocol using social capital - trust and influence from social interactions - as a non-transferable…