Related papers: Persistence, patience and costly information acqui…
Bayesian persuasion is a model for understanding strategic information revelation: an agent with an informational advantage, called a sender, strategically discloses information by sending signals to another agent, called a receiver. In…
A decision maker's utility depends on her action $a\in A \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ and the payoff relevant state of the world $\theta\in \Theta$. One can define the value of acquiring new information as the difference between the maximum…
This exercise proposes a learning mechanism to model economic agent's decision-making process using an actor-critic structure in the literature of artificial intelligence. It is motivated by the psychology literature of learning through…
We study the interaction between strategy, heterogeneity and growth in a two-agent model of capital accumulation. Preferences are represented by recursive utility functions with decreasing marginal impatience. The stationary equilibria of…
We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities, a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field corresponds to the idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price, agents…
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…
Reinforcement learning agents have demonstrated remarkable achievements in simulated environments. Data efficiency poses an impediment to carrying this success over to real environments. The design of data-efficient agents calls for a…
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…
Decisions are often made by heterogeneous groups of individuals, each with distinct initial biases and access to information of different quality. We show that in large groups of independent agents who accumulate evidence the first to…
Social learning, a fundamental process through which individuals shape their beliefs and perspectives via observation and interaction with others, is critical for the development of our society and the functioning of social governance.…
We study a single-buyer pricing problem with unreliable side information, motivated by the increasing use of AI-assisted decision-making and LLM-based predictions. The seller observes a private sample that may be either accurate (coinciding…
In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…
If we could define the set of all bad outcomes, we could hard-code an agent which avoids them; however, in sufficiently complex environments, this is infeasible. We do not know of any general-purpose approaches in the literature to avoiding…
This paper studies AI persuasion by distinguishing between two reasons for disagreement: attention differences, where the AI detects features the decision-maker missed, and comprehension differences, where the AI and the decision-maker…
This paper studies a central planner's decision making on behalf of a group of members with diverse discount rates. In the context of optimal stopping, we work with an aggregation preference to incorporate all discount rates via an attitude…
Current agentic AI benchmarks predominantly evaluate task completion accuracy, while overlooking critical enterprise requirements such as cost-efficiency, reliability, and operational stability. Through systematic analysis of 12 main…
Companies like Google and Microsoft run billions of auctions every day to sell advertising opportunities. Any change to the rules of these auctions can have a tremendous effect on the revenue of the company and the welfare of the…
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when the receiver exhibits systematic biases away from…
We analyze a problem of revealed preference given state-dependent stochastic choice data in which the payoff to a decision maker (DM) only depends on their beliefs about posterior means. Often, the DM must also learn about or pay attention…
This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…