Collective states in social systems with interacting learning agents
Physics and Society
2009-11-13 v1
Abstract
We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities, a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field corresponds to the idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price, agents decide repeatedly whether to buy or not a unit of a good, so as to maximize their expected utilities. We show that the equilibrium reached by the system depends on the nature of the information agents use to estimate their expected utilities.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.0704.2324,
title = {Collective states in social systems with interacting learning agents},
author = {Viktoriya Semeshenko and Mirta B. Gordon and Jean-Pierre Nadal},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0704.2324},
year = {2009}
}