Related papers: Perpetually Fair Assignments Via Balanced Sequence…
We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her…
We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em…
We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…
In the allocation of indivisible goods, a prominent fairness notion is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We initiate the study of reachability problems in fair division by investigating the problem of whether one EF1 allocation can be…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate m indivisible chores to n (asymmetric) agents. We consider (weighted) proportionality up to any item (PROPX) and show that a (weighted) PROPX allocation always exists and can be computed…
We study fair division of indivisible items under a variable input setting, where the set of agents or items may change over time. Starting from an arbitrary allocation, the goal is to restore envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) through item…
A set of permutations is called sign-balanced if the set contains the same number of even permutations as odd permutations. Let $S_n(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \ldots, \sigma_r)$ be the set of permutations in the symmetric group $S_n$ which avoids…
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…
We study temporal fair division, whereby a set of agents are allocated a (possibly different) set of goods on each day for a period of days. We study this setting, as well as a number of its special cases formed by the restrictions to two…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
Given a set of $p$ players we consider problems concerning envy-free allocation of collections of $k$ pieces from a given set of goods or chores. We show that if $p\le n$ and each player can choose $k$ pieces out of $n$ pieces of a cake,…
Prior work studies the question of ``fairly'' ordering transactions in a replicated state machine. Each of $n$ replicas receives transactions in a possibly different order, and the system must aggregate the observed orderings into a single…
We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are…
Free order prophet inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting a value from a set of independent random variables: a "prophet" who knows the value of each variable and may select the…
We consider the following control problem on fair allocation of indivisible goods. Given a set $I$ of items and a set of agents, each having strict linear preference over the items, we ask for a minimum subset of the items whose deletion…
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…