Related papers: Efficient Interview Scheduling for Stable Matching
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…
Motivated by our collaboration with a major refugee resettlement agency in the U.S., we study a dynamic matching problem where each new arrival (a refugee case) must be matched immediately and irrevocably to one of the static resources (a…
Non-stationary signals are ubiquitous in real life. Many techniques have been proposed in the last decades which allow decomposing multi-component signals into simple oscillatory mono-components, like the groundbreaking Empirical Mode…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
Learning in multi-agent environments is difficult due to the non-stationarity introduced by an opponent's or partner's changing behaviors. Instead of reactively adapting to the other agent's (opponent or partner) behavior, we propose an…
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and…
We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite extensive study of the problem by experts from different areas, the question of whether every instance of…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates "two-sided" manipulation of the…
We consider a model for repeated stochastic matching where compatibility is probabilistic, is realized the first time agents are matched, and persists in the future. Such a model has applications in the gig economy, kidney exchange, and…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
Schema matching is the process of identifying correspondences between the elements of two given schemata, essential for database management systems, data integration, and data warehousing. For datasets across different scenarios, the…
A run of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm may contain proposals that are sure to be rejected. We introduce the accelerated deferred acceptance algorithm that proceeds in a similar manner to DA but with sure-to-be rejected proposals…
In matching markets such as kidney exchanges and freight exchanges, delayed matching has been shown to improve overall market efficiency. The benefits of delay are highly sensitive to participants' sojourn times and departure behavior, and…
We investigate the scheduling of a common resource between several concurrent users when the feasible transmission rate of each user varies randomly over time. Time is slotted and users arrive and depart upon service completion. This may…
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…