Speeding up deferred acceptance
Theoretical Economics
2024-09-13 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
A run of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm may contain proposals that are sure to be rejected. We introduce the accelerated deferred acceptance algorithm that proceeds in a similar manner to DA but with sure-to-be rejected proposals ruled out. Accelerated deferred acceptance outputs the same stable matching as DA but does so more efficiently: it terminates in weakly fewer rounds, requires weakly fewer proposals, and final pairs match no later. Computational experiments show that these efficiency savings can be strict.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2409.06865,
title = {Speeding up deferred acceptance},
author = {Gregory Z. Gutin and Daniel Karapetyan and Philip R. Neary and Alexander Vickery and Anders Yeo},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.06865},
year = {2024}
}