Related papers: Bessel Function Analysis of Nesterov's ODE in $N$-…
To facilitate effective, safe deployment in the real world, individual robots must reason about interactions with other agents, which often occur without explicit communication. Recent work has identified game theory, particularly the…
We study the problem of computing stationary Nash equilibria in discounted perfect information stochastic games from the viewpoint of computational complexity. For two-player games we prove the problem to be in PPAD, which together with a…
Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the…
Towards characterizing the optimization landscape of games, this paper analyzes the stability of gradient-based dynamics near fixed points of two-player continuous games. We introduce the quadratic numerical range as a method to…
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…
We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifically, we present the first distributed SGNE seeking algorithm for monotone games that requires one…
Momentum based stochastic gradient methods such as heavy ball (HB) and Nesterov's accelerated gradient descent (NAG) method are widely used in practice for training deep networks and other supervised learning models, as they often provide…
We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…
In this paper, we consider game problems played by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based component,…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
In this work, we establish a frequency-domain framework for analyzing gradient-based algorithms in linear minimax optimization problems; specifically, our approach is based on the Z-transform, a powerful tool applied in Control Theory and…
In this paper, we propose Nesterov Accelerated Shuffling Gradient (NASG), a new algorithm for the convex finite-sum minimization problems. Our method integrates the traditional Nesterov's acceleration momentum with different shuffling…
We study the instability properties of Nesterov's ODE in non-conservative settings, where the driving term is not necessarily the gradient of a potential function. While convergence properties under Nesterov's ODE are well-characterized for…
The development of extremum seeking (ES) has progressed, over the past hundred years, from static maps, to finite-dimensional dynamic systems, to networks of static and dynamic agents. Extensions from ODE dynamics to maps and agents that…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player, bilinear game with a bounded payoff matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, when the players' strategies are constrained to lie in simple sets. We…
We investigate the complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games. Our main algorithmic result is the following: For any $n$-player anonymous game with a bounded number of strategies and any constant $\delta>0$, an…
The framework of multi-agent learning explores the dynamics of how individual agent strategies evolve in response to the evolving strategies of other agents. Of particular interest is whether or not agent strategies converge to well known…