Related papers: Majoritarian Assignment Rules
In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the projects, while the projects are equipped with a lower and…
We consider one variant of stable assignment problems in a bipartite graph endowed with nonnegative capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices. It can be viewed as a generalization of the stable allocation problem introduced by…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
Given a connected graph on whose edges we can build roads to connect the nodes, a number of agents hold possibly different perspectives on which edges should be selected by assigning different edge weights. Our task is to build a minimum…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of…
This paper addresses the task allocation problem for multi-robot systems. The main issue with the task allocation problem is inherent complexity that makes finding an optimal solution within a reasonable time almost impossible. To hand the…
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show…
In the paradigm of multi-task learning, mul- tiple related prediction tasks are learned jointly, sharing information across the tasks. We propose a framework for multi-task learn- ing that enables one to selectively share the information…
In this paper we introduce a mathematical model that captures some of the salient features of recommender systems that are based on popularity and that try to exploit social ties among the users. We show that, under very general conditions,…
An essential task of groups is to provide efficient solutions for the complex problems they face. Indeed, considerable efforts have been devoted to the question of collective decision-making related to problems involving a single dominant…
The heterogeneity of the influence processes is an important feature of social systems: how we perceive social influence and how we influence other individuals is heavily influenced by our opinion and non-opinion attributes. The latter…
I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the…
I provide a novel approach to characterizing the set of interim realizable allocations, in the spirit of Matthews (1984) and Border (1991). The approach allows me to identify precisely why exact characterizations are difficult to obtain in…
This paper considers trial-offer markets where consumer preferences are modeled by a multinomial logit with social influence and position bias. The social signal for a product is given by its current market share raised to power r (or…
We consider the problem of steering a multi-agent system to multi-consensus, namely a regime where groups of agents agree on a given value which may be different from group to group. We first address the problem by using distributed…
We consider a moral hazard problem with multiple principals in a continuous-time model. The agent can only work exclusively for one principal at a given time, so faces an optimal switching problem. Using a randomized formulation, we manage…
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the…