Related papers: Majoritarian Assignment Rules
We study the collective schedules problem, which consists in computing a one machine schedule of a set of tasks, knowing that a set of individuals (also called voters) have preferences regarding the order of the execution of the tasks. Our…
We study the implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules via simply dominant mechanisms (Pycia and Troyan, 2019) in the context of assignment problems, where agents are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and…
In the standard model of fair allocation of resources to agents, every agent has some utility for every resource, and the goal is to assign resources to agents so that the agents' welfare is maximized. Motivated by job scheduling, interest…
We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We consider social learning where agents can only observe part of the population (modeled as neighbors on an undirected graph), face many decision problems, and arrival order of the agents is unknown. The central question we pose is whether…
In the unidimensional unfolding model, given m objects in general position there arise 1+m(m-1)/2 rankings. The set of rankings is called the ranking pattern of the m given objects. By changing these m objects, we can generate various…
In this paper, we consider a network of agents that has to self-assign a set of tasks while respecting resource constraints. One possible formulation is the Generalized Assignment Problem, where the goal is to find a maximum payoff while…
The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism…
Current alignment pipelines presume a single, universal notion of desirable behavior. However, human preferences often diverge across users, contexts, and cultures. As a result, disagreement collapses into the majority signal and minority…
We define and analyze a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in which decision-making agents can observe the choices and rewards of their neighbors. Neighbors are defined by a network graph with heterogeneous and stochastic…
In school districts where assignments are exclusively determined by a clearinghouse students can only appeal their assignment with a valid reason. An assignment is incontestable if it is appeal-proof. We study incontestability when students…
While sequential task assignment for a single agent has been widely studied, such problems in a multi-agent setting, where the agents have heterogeneous task preferences or capabilities, remain less well-characterized. We study a…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…
We address the problem of learning to assign prediction tasks to one agent from a set of available human or AI agents. In particular, we focus on the sequential learning of agent expertise and assignment policies where each agent is…
This paper presented insights into the implementation of transactive multi-agent systems over flow networks where local resources are decentralized. Agents have local resource demand and supply, and are interconnected through a flow network…
We consider the general problem of geometric task allocation, wherein a large, decentralised swarm of simple mobile agents must detect the locations of tasks in the plane and position themselves nearby. The tasks are represented by an a…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and…
Team adaptation to new cooperative tasks is a hallmark of human intelligence, which has yet to be fully realized in learning agents. Previous work on multi-agent transfer learning accommodate teams of different sizes, heavily relying on the…