Related papers: Tight Inapproximability for Welfare-Maximizing Aut…
The design of the best economic mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) is a central task in computational mechanism design/game theory. Two open questions concern the adoption of user models more accurate than that one currently…
Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction, which does not realistically model the Generalized…
We study the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among a set of agents under the fairness notion of Any Price Share (APS). APS is known to dominate the widely studied Maximin share (MMS). Since an exact APS allocation may not…
We study the revenue guarantees and approximability of item pricing. Recent work shows that with $n$ heterogeneous items, item-pricing guarantees an $O(\log n)$ approximation to the optimal revenue achievable by any (buy-many) mechanism,…
This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce $t$-level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare…
We consider the efficient outcome of a canonical economic market model involving buyers and sellers with independent and identically distributed random valuations and costs, respectively. When the number of buyers and sellers is large, we…
We study coverage problems in which, for a set of agents and a given threshold $T$, the goal is to select $T$ subsets (of the agents) that, while satisfying combinatorial constraints, achieve fair and efficient coverage among the agents. In…
In quasi-proportional auctions, each bidder receives a fraction of the allocation equal to the weight of their bid divided by the sum of weights of all bids, where each bid's weight is determined by a weight function. We study the…
An NP-hard combinatorial optimization problem $\Pi$ is said to have an {\em approximation threshold} if there is some $t$ such that the optimal value of $\Pi$ can be approximated in polynomial time within a ratio of $t$, and it is NP-hard…
Many policy problems involve designing individualized treatment allocation rules to maximize the equilibrium social welfare of interacting agents. Focusing on large-scale simultaneous decision games with strategic complementarities, we…
We perform a simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions modeled as one-shot games of incomplete information to study a series of mechanism design questions. Our first question addresses the degree to which incentive compatibility fails…
The Nash social welfare (NSW) is a well-known social welfare measurement that balances individual utilities and the overall efficiency. In the context of fair allocation of indivisible goods, it has been shown by Caragiannis et al. (EC 2016…
We study the problem of computing data-driven personalized reserve prices in eager second price auctions without having any assumption on valuation distributions. Here, the input is a data-set that contains the submitted bids of $n$ buyers…
We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…
Given a set of $m$ agents and a set of $n$ items, where agent $A$ has utility $u_{A,i}$ for item $i$, our goal is to allocate items to agents to maximize fairness. Specifically, the utility of an agent is the sum of its utilities for items…
Reinforcement learning has been shown to be an effective strategy for automatically training policies for challenging control problems. Focusing on non-cooperative multi-agent systems, we propose a novel reinforcement learning framework for…
This work studies equilibrium problems under uncertainty where firms maximize their profits in a robust way when selling their output. Robust optimization plays an increasingly important role when best guaranteed objective values are to be…
We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian Price of Anarchy of these auctions are e/(e-1) [Syrgkanis and Tardos…
In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…
We consider the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) while allocating a set of indivisible items to $n$ agents. The NSW is a popular objective that provides a balanced tradeoff between the often conflicting…