Related papers: Full characterization of core for nonlinear optimi…
This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…
We study fair allocation of profit (or cost) for three central problems from combinatorial optimization: Max-Flow, MST and $b$-matching. The essentially unequivocal choice of solution concept for this purpose would be the core, because of…
We propose a class of cooperative games, called d Partitioned Compbinatorial Optimization Games (PCOGs). The input of PCOG consists of a set of agents and a combinatorial structure (typically a graph) with a fixed optimization goal on this…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions. We show that the canonical utility maximisation is one special case of a quantifier and that our more…
The ``losing positions" of certain combinatorial games constitute linear error detecting and correcting codes. We show that a large class of games that can be cast in the form of *annihilation games*, provides a potentially polynomial…
The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and Shubik and every…
We define a model for linear logic based on two well-known ingredients: games and simulations. This model is interesting in the following respect: while it is obvious that the objects interpreting formulas are games and that everything is…
We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign positive probability over all possible coalition structures that the non-members can form. We show that when…
We study bargaining games between suppliers and manufacturers in a network context. Agents wish to enter into contracts in order to generate surplus which then must be divided among the participants. Potential contracts and their surplus…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the…
A central challenge in game theory and learning systems such as GANs is understanding which algorithms can efficiently compute equilibria across the heterogeneous landscape of games. Equilibrium computation is typically studied solver by…
The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…
This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…
When predictive models are used to support complex and important decisions, the ability to explain a model's reasoning can increase trust, expose hidden biases, and reduce vulnerability to adversarial attacks. However, attempts at…
People can evaluate features of problems and their potential solutions well before we can effectively solve them. When considering a game we have never played, for instance, we might infer whether it is likely to be challenging, fair, or…
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
We study the classical and quantum values of one- and two-party linear games, an important class of unique games that generalizes the well-known XOR games to the case of non-binary outcomes. We introduce a ``constraint graph" associated to…
Nearly all simulation-based games have environment parameters that affect incentives in the interaction but are not explicitly incorporated into the game model. To understand the impact of these parameters on strategic incentives, typical…