Cooperative oligopoly games: a probabilistic approach
Computer Science and Game Theory
2011-07-19 v1
Abstract
We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign positive probability over all possible coalition structures that the non-members can form. We show that when the number of firms in the market is sufficiently large then the core of the underlying cooperative game is non-empty. Moreover, we show that the core of our game is a subset of the \gamma - core.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1107.3197,
title = {Cooperative oligopoly games: a probabilistic approach},
author = {Paraskevas V. Lekeas and Giorgos Stamatopoulos},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1107.3197},
year = {2011}
}