Related papers: Public Goods Provision in Directed Networks: A Ker…

Distribution regression refers to the supervised learning problem where labels are only available for groups of inputs instead of individual inputs. In this paper, we develop a rigorous mathematical framework for distribution regression…

We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…

In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…

We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. We focus on semi-decentralized communication architectures, where there is a central…

In decentralized systems, nodes often need to coordinate to access shared resources in a fair manner. One approach to perform such arbitration is to rely on auction mechanisms. Although there is an extensive literature that studies…

Building upon the results in [Hinterm\"uller et al., SIAM J. Optim, '15], generalized Nash equilibrium problems are considered, in which the feasible set of each player is influenced by the decisions of their competitors. This is realized…

The ability to control complex networks is of crucial importance across a wide range of applications in natural and engineering sciences. However, issues of both theoretical and numerical nature introduce fundamental limitations to…

This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…

We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…

Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…

We provide a framework for determining the centralities of agents in a broad family of random networks. Current understanding of network centrality is largely restricted to deterministic settings, but practitioners frequently use random…

In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…

We introduce a new type of graphical model called a "cumulative distribution network" (CDN), which expresses a joint cumulative distribution as a product of local functions. Each local function can be viewed as providing evidence about…

This paper aims to design a distributed coordination algorithm for solving a multi-agent decision problem with a hierarchical structure. The primary goal is to search the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game such that each player has…

Kernel based methods provide a way to reconstruct potentially high-dimensional functions from meshfree samples, i.e., sampling points and corresponding target values. A crucial ingredient for this to be successful is the distribution of the…

In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…

We consider the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario. Specifically, each agent can only receive information from some neighbors via a communication network, while its cost function depends on the strategies of…

We study the averaging-based distributed optimization solvers over random networks. We show a general result on the convergence of such schemes using weight-matrices that are row-stochastic almost surely and column-stochastic in expectation…

Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocation satisfies desirable stability and proportional fairness…