Related papers: Analytical Stackelberg Resource Allocation in Sequ…

We study a multi-body asset-guarding game in missile defense where teams of interceptor missiles collaborate to defend a non-manuevering asset against a group of threat missiles. We approach the problem in two steps. We first formulate an…

The paper proposes a novel neuroevolutionary method (NESG) for calculating leader's payoff in Stackelberg Security Games. The heart of NESG is strategy evaluation neural network (SENN). SENN is able to effectively evaluate leader's…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

Previous research has shown that federated learning (FL) systems are exposed to an array of security risks. Despite the proposal of several defensive strategies, they tend to be non-adaptive and specific to certain types of attacks,…

We adopt a game theoretic approach for the design and analysis of distributed resource allocation algorithms in fading multiple access channels. The users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. We…

This paper proposes a game theoretic framework that models the interaction between prompt engineers and large language models (LLMs) as a two player extensive form game coupled with a Rapidly exploring Random Trees (RRT) search over prompt…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

Security attacks present unique challenges to self-adaptive system design due to the adversarial nature of the environment. However, modeling the system as a single player, as done in prior works in security domain, is insufficient for the…

We study an auction with $m$ identical items in a context where $n$ agents can arbitrarily commit to strategies. In general, such commitments non-trivially change the equilibria by inducing a metagame of choosing which strategies to commit…

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

In cybersecurity, attackers range from brash, unsophisticated script kiddies and cybercriminals to stealthy, patient advanced persistent threats. When modeling these attackers, we can observe that they demonstrate different risk-seeking and…

We consider the following two-player game: using observational data, the leader chooses a prediction function for a response variable $Y$ from given covariates. The follower then reacts with an intervention on some covariates in the…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…

We study payoff manipulation in repeated multi-objective Stackelberg games, where a leader may strategically influence a follower's deterministic best response, e.g., by offering a share of their own payoff. We assume that the follower's…

In this work, we introduce the Deceptive Resource Allocation Game (DRAG), which studies purposeful deception within a Bayesian game framework. In DRAG, a Defender allocates resources across the true asset and several decoys to influence an…

This paper investigates a Stackelberg game between an insurer and a reinsurer under the $\alpha$-maxmin mean-variance criterion. The insurer can purchase per-loss reinsurance from the reinsurer. With the insurer's feedback reinsurance…

We introduce the study of search games between a mobile Searcher and an immobile Hider in a new setting in which the Searcher has some potentially erroneous information, i.e., a prediction on the Hider's position. The objective is to…

We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD). We assume that players make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player's strategy is a function from the convex hull $\mathfrak{S}$ of the set of payoffs…

This article considers a problem arising from a two-player game based on the classical secretary problem. First, Player 1 selects one object from a sequence as in the secretary problem. All of the other objects are then presented to Player…