Related papers: Analytical Stackelberg Resource Allocation in Sequ…

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower differential game with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. In the game, the follower is a random controller which means that the follower can choose adapted…

Stackelberg equilibria arise naturally in a range of popular learning problems, such as in security games or indirect mechanism design, and have received increasing attention in the reinforcement learning literature. We present a general…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

We consider a security game in a setting consisting of two players (an attacker and a defender), each with a given budget to allocate towards attack and defense, respectively, of a set of nodes. Each node has a certain value to the attacker…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

Cybersecurity planning supports the selection of and implementation of security controls in resource-constrained settings to manage risk. Doing so requires considering adaptive adversaries with different levels of strategic sophistication…

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…

We present a numerical approach to finding optimal trajectories for players in a multi-body, asset-guarding game with nonlinear dynamics and non-convex constraints. Using the Iterative Best Response (IBR) scheme, we solve for each player's…

Infrastructure systems are increasingly facing new security threats due to the vulnerabilities of cyber-physical components that support their operation. In this article, we investigate how the infrastructure operator (defender) should…

This paper investigates a hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game between one reinsurer and two insurers, including a stochastic Stackelberg differential subgame and a non-zero-sum stochastic differential subgame. The…

In order to balance the interests of integrated energy operator (IEO) and users, a novel Stackelberg game-based optimization framework is proposed for the optimal scheduling of integrated demand response (IDR)-enabled integrated energy…

Ensuring public safety in a Smart City (SC) environment is a critical and increasingly complicated task due to the involvement of multiple agencies and the city's expansion across cyber and social layers. In this paper, we propose an…

We study the problem of online learning in Stackelberg games with side information between a leader and a sequence of followers. In every round the leader observes contextual information and commits to a mixed strategy, after which the…

The field of cybersecurity has mostly been a cat-and-mouse game with the discovery of new attacks leading the way. To take away an attacker's advantage of reconnaissance, researchers have proposed proactive defense methods such as Moving…

We investigate the linear quadratic Gaussian Stackelberg game under a class of nested observation information pattern. Two decision makers implement control strategies relying on different information sets: The follower uses its observation…

This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

In this paper we consider a defending problem on a network. In the model, the defender holds a total defending resource of R, which can be distributed to the nodes of the network. The defending resource allocated to a node can be shared by…

In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the…