Related papers: Robust equilibria in continuous games: From strate…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…
This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally generalizes the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE). The RSE accounts for any possible…
We derive the rate of convergence to the strongly variationally stable Nash equilibrium in a convex game, for a zeroth-order learning algorithm. Though we do not assume strong monotonicity of the game, our rates for the one-point feedback…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
The multi-population replicator dynamics (RD) can be considered a dynamic approach to the study of multi-player games, where it was shown to be related to Cross' learning, as well as of systems of coevolving populations. However, not all of…
We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…
In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two…
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…
Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…
The notion of fault tolerant Nash equilibria has been introduced as a way of studying the robustness of Nash equilibria. Under this notion, a fixed number of players are allowed to exhibit faulty behavior in which they may deviate…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…