Related papers: Robust equilibria in continuous games: From strate…

We design a distributed algorithm to seek generalized Nash equilibria of a robust game with uncertain coupled constraints. Due to the uncertainty of parameters in set constraints, we aim to find a generalized Nash equilibrium in the worst…

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making…

We prove that differential Nash equilibria are generic amongst local Nash equilibria in continuous zero-sum games. That is, there exists an open-dense subset of zero-sum games for which local Nash equilibria are non-degenerate differential…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

We propose a novel framework for robust dynamic games with nonlinear dynamics corrupted by state-dependent additive noise, and nonlinear agent-specific and shared constraints. Leveraging system-level synthesis (SLS), each agent designs a…

We study the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in concurrent games played on graphs. While existence is guaranteed with safety objectives for each player, Nash equilibria need not exist when players are given arbitrary terminal-reward…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…

We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…

We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

This paper aims to accommodate games in which the players' dynamics are subject to un-modeled and disturbance terms. The un-modeled and disturbance terms are regarded as extended states for which observers are designed to estimate them.…

This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…