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Public goods are often either over-consumed in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, or remain completely unused, as in the Covid-19 pandemic, where social distance constraints are enforced to limit the number of people who can share public…
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent…
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
Electricity market operators worldwide use mixed-integer linear programming to solve the allocation problem in wholesale electricity markets. Prices are typically determined based on the duals of relaxed versions of this optimization…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
Applications of combinatorial auctions (CA) as market mechanisms are prevalent in practice, yet their Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) remain poorly understood. Analytical solutions are known only for a few cases where the problem can be…
Auctions are widely used in exchanges to match buy and sell requests. Once the buyers and sellers place their requests, the exchange determines how these requests are to be matched. The two most popular objectives used while determining the…
Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. Price differences might occur due to various reasons such as shipping costs, trade restrictions and price discrimination. To model such…
It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the non-convex, uniform-price Pan-European day-ahead electricity market "PCR" (Price…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verification phase that computes an upper bound on…
Equilibrium problems in Bayesian auction games can be described as systems of differential equations. Depending on the model assumptions, these equations might be such that we do not have a rigorous mathematical solution theory. The lack of…
Classical algorithms for market equilibrium computation such as proportional response dynamics face scalability issues with Internet-based applications such as auctions, recommender systems, and fair division, despite having an almost…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
In this paper, we present a new model and two mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments, and is applicable to a wide…
T\^atonnement is a simple, intuitive market process where prices are iteratively adjusted based on the difference between demand and supply. Many variants under different market assumptions have been studied and shown to converge to a…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…