Related papers: Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Ration…
The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic…
Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectrum allocation, and myriad financial markets. Analytic…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong…
We consider the problem of finding the (unique) minimal Walrasian equilibrium price in multi-item, multi-unit auction models: there are multiple indivisible items for sale, with several units of each item, and a bidder may be interested in…
We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…
A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…
We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank…
Optimal transportation theory is an area of mathematics with real-world applications in fields ranging from economics to optimal control to machine learning. We propose a new algorithm for solving discrete transport (network flow) problems,…
We present the following results pertaining to Fisher's market model: -We give two natural generalizations of Fisher's market model: In model M_1, sellers can declare an upper bound on the money they wish to earn (and take back their unsold…
We consider a nonlinear extension of the generalized network flow model, with the flow leaving an arc being an increasing concave function of the flow entering it, as proposed by Truemper and Shigeno. We give a polynomial time combinatorial…
In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…
In this paper, we propose a bilateral peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme under single-contract and multi-contract market setups, both as an assignment game, and a special class of coalitional games. {The proposed market formulation…
The complex interactions between algorithmic trading agents can have a severe influence on the functioning of our economy, as witnessed by recent banking crises and trading anomalies. A common phenomenon in these situations are fire sales,…
The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a…
As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an…
We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time polynomial in market parameters and $\log…
This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models of exchange economies, we consider a finite set of agents described by their initial endowments and…