Related papers: Peace Talk and Conflict Traps

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed as autonomous agents on behalf of institutions and individuals in economic, political, and social settings that involve negotiation. Yet this trend carries significant risks if…

Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated $n$-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash…

This paper asks whether large language models (LLMs) can be used to study the strategic foundations of conflict and cooperation. I introduce LLMs as experimental subjects in a repeated security dilemma and evaluate whether they reproduce…

We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the…

Although cooperation is central to the organisation of many social systems, relatively little is known about cooperation in situations of collective emergency. When groups of people flee from a danger such as a burning building or a…

We study the coevolution of network structure and signaling behavior. We model agents who can preferentially associate with others in a dynamic network while they also learn to play a simple sender-receiver game. We have four major…

As LLMs gain persuasive capabilities through extended dialogues, they create new opportunities for studying adversarial conversational behavior in extended interaction settings that traditional single-turn safety evaluations fail to…

Social networks on the Internet have seen an enormous growth recently and play a crucial role in different aspects of today's life. They have facilitated information dissemination in ways that have been beneficial for their users but they…

Empirical studies show that preference for prevention versus treatment remains a subject of debate. We build a paradigm model combining a utility game for the individual-level dilemma of prevention versus treatment, and a compartmental…

This paper introduces a novel framework for modeling interacting humans in a multi-stage game. This "iterated semi network-form game" framework has the following desirable characteristics: (1) Bounded rational players, (2) strategic players…

Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…

Motivated by cognitive radio networks, we consider the stochastic multiplayer multi-armed bandit problem, where several players pull arms simultaneously and collisions occur if one of them is pulled by several players at the same stage. We…

Knowing how to end and resume conversations over time is a natural part of communication, allowing for discussions to span weeks, months, or years. The duration of gaps between conversations dictates which topics are relevant and which…

This paper considers Bayesian persuasion for routing games where information about the uncertain state of the network is provided by a traffic information system (TIS) using public signals. In this setup, the TIS commits to a signalling…

Social media platforms systematically reward popularity over authenticity, incentivizing users to strategically tailor their expression for attention. In this paper, we introduce (i) popularity as a strategic expression mechanism, distinct…

Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the…

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism by which individuals cooperate with those who have cooperated with others. This creates a regime in which repeated interactions are not necessary to incent cooperation (as would be required for direct…

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…

In multi-agent environments in which coordination is desirable, the history of play often causes lock-in at sub-optimal outcomes. Notoriously, technologies with a significant environmental footprint or high social cost persist despite the…