Related papers: Peace Talk and Conflict Traps
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
Situations where people have to decide between hurting themselves or another person are at the core of many individual and global conflicts. Yet little is known about how people behave when facing these situations in the lab. Here we report…
Honest signals and cues have been observed as part of interspecific and intraspecific communication among animals. Recent theories suggest that existing signaling systems have evolved through natural selection imposed by predators. Honest…
Strategic behaviour is one of the main explanations for cost overruns. It can theoretically be supported by agency theory, in which strategic behaviour is the result of asymmetric information between the principal and agent. This paper…
We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the…
The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, using such an agent involves the user exposing themselves to the risk that the…
Are big conflicts different from small or medium size conflicts? To answer this question, we leverage fine-grained conflict data, which we map to climate, geography, infrastructure, economics, raw demographics, and demographic composition…
In this paper, we study the collaborative learning model, which concerns the tradeoff between parallelism and communication overhead in multi-agent multi-armed bandits. For regret minimization in multi-armed bandits, we present the first…
The main approach to evaluating communication is by assessing how well it facilitates coordination. If two or more individuals can coordinate through communication, it is generally assumed that they understand one another. We investigate…
The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…
Human conflict is often attributed to threats against material conditions and symbolic values, yet it remains unclear how they interact and which dominates. Progress is limited by weak causal control, ethical constraints, and scarce…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
This paper investigates how natural language communication with an AI agent affects human cooperative behaviour in indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. We conduct a laboratory experiment (n = 126) with two between-subjects…
We analyze the dynamic tradeoff between generating and disclosing evidence. Agents are tempted to delay investing in a new technology in order to learn from information generated by the experiences of others. This informational free-riding…
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…
We present a new model for reasoning about the way information is shared among friends in a social network, and the resulting ways in which it spreads. Our model formalizes the intuition that revealing personal information in social…
In competitive adversarial environments, it is often advantageous to obfuscate one's strategies or capabilities. However, revealing one's strategic intentions may shift the dynamics of the competition in complex ways. Can it ever be…
Cooperation for public goods poses a dilemma, where individuals are tempted to free ride on others' contributions. Classic solutions involve monitoring, reputation maintenance and costly incentives, but there are important collective…
Accurate remote state estimation is a fundamental component of many autonomous and networked dynamical systems, where multiple decision-making agents interact and communicate over shared, bandwidth-constrained channels. These communication…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…