Related papers: {\epsilon}-Optimally Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum P…
In this work, we propose, for the first time, a reinforcement learning framework specifically designed for zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games. This approach offers a generalized solution for scenarios in which accurate…
For a zero-sum stochastic game which does not satisfy the Isaacs condition, we provide a value function representation for an Isaacs-type equation whose Hamiltonian lies in between the lower and upper Hamiltonians, as a convex combination…
Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into…
We explored the Patrol Security Game (PSG), a robotic patrolling problem modeled as an extensive-form Stackelberg game, where the attacker determines the timing, location, and duration of their attack. Our objective is to devise a…
We propose a policy iteration method to solve an inverse problem for a mean-field game (MFG) model, specifically to reconstruct the obstacle function in the game from the partial observation data of value functions, which represent the…
In this work, we consider the problem of a two-player zero-sum game. In the literature, the successive over-relaxation Q-learning algorithm has been developed and implemented, and it is seen to result in a lower contraction factor for the…
For model checking stochastic games (SGs), bounded value iteration (BVI) algorithms have gained attention as efficient approximate methods with rigorous precision guarantees. However, BVI may not terminate or converge when the target SG…
This paper studies a risk minimization problem with decision dependent data distribution. The problem pertains to the performative prediction setting in which a trained model can affect the outcome estimated by the model. Such dependency…
We study turn-based stochastic zero-sum games with lexicographic preferences over reachability and safety objectives. Stochastic games are standard models in control, verification, and synthesis of stochastic reactive systems that exhibit…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…
Using semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the profile evolutionary equation (PEE) for repeated finite games is obtained. By virtue of PEE, the zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are developed for general finite games. A formula is then…
This paper proposes a new method for finding closed-loop saddle points in zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games by decoupling their inherent structure. Specifically, we develop a nested iterative scheme that constructs a…
This paper considers offline multi-agent reinforcement learning. We propose the strategy-wise concentration principle which directly builds a confidence interval for the joint strategy, in contrast to the point-wise concentration principle…
The paper introduces a generic approach to solving Sequential Security Games (SGs) which utilizes Evolutionary Algorithms. Formulation of the method (named EASG) is general and largely game-independent, which allows for its application to a…
This paper is concerned with a new type of differential game problems of forwardbackward stochastic systems. There are three distinguishing features: Firstly, our game systems are forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations,…
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…
We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) $g$-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum…
We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where…