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The Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes rational play in imperfect-information Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) but fails to ensure optimal strategies for off-equilibrium branches of the game tree, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes in…

Regret minimization has played a key role in online learning, equilibrium computation in games, and reinforcement learning (RL). In this paper, we describe a general model-free RL method for no-regret learning based on repeated…

We provide a formal definition of depth-limited games together with an accessible and rigorous explanation of the underlying concepts, both of which were previously missing in imperfect-information games. The definition works for an…

Regret minimization is a powerful method for finding Nash equilibria in Normal-Form Games (NFGs) and Extensive-Form Games (EFGs), but it typically guarantees convergence only for the average strategy. However, computing the average strategy…

This paper investigates a class of games with large strategy spaces, motivated by challenges in AI alignment and language games. We introduce the hidden game problem, where for each player, an unknown subset of strategies consistently…

In this paper, we investigate the power of {\it regularization}, a common technique in reinforcement learning and optimization, in solving extensive-form games (EFGs). We propose a series of new algorithms based on regularizing the payoff…

Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…

Recent advances, such as RegretNet, ALGnet, RegretFormer and CITransNet, use deep learning to approximate optimal multi item auctions by relaxing incentive compatibility (IC) and measuring its violation via ex post regret. However, the true…

In game theory, imperfect-recall decision problems model situations in which an agent forgets information it held before. They encompass games such as the ``absentminded driver'' and team games with limited communication. In this paper, we…

Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…

Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the decision maker tries to…

Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment, e.g. a driver deciding what route to drive to work every day. While regret…

Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale problems; it was recently used in breakthrough results for large-scale extensive-form game solving. This was achieved by composing simplex regret minimizers into an overall…

A crucial problem in reinforcement learning is learning the optimal policy. We study this in tabular infinite-horizon discounted Markov decision processes under the online setting. The existing algorithms either fail to achieve regret…

The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…

We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and…

Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be…

We study online learning problems in which the learner has extra knowledge about the adversary's behaviour, i.e., in game-theoretic settings where opponents typically follow some no-external regret learning algorithms. Under this…

We present the OMG-CMDP! algorithm for regret minimization in adversarial Contextual MDPs. The algorithm operates under the minimal assumptions of realizable function class and access to online least squares and log loss regression oracles.…

Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…