Related papers: Deep (Predictive) Discounted Counterfactual Regret…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization and variants (e.g. Public Chance Sampling CFR and Pure CFR) have been known as the best approaches for creating approximate Nash equilibrium solutions for imperfect information games such as poker. This…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and its variants are widely recognized as effective algorithms for solving extensive-form imperfect information games. Recently, many improvements have been focused on enhancing the convergence speed…
In many real-world scenarios, a team of agents coordinate with each other to compete against an opponent. The challenge of solving this type of game is that the team's joint action space grows exponentially with the number of agents, which…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and its variants developed based upon Regret Matching (RM) have been considered to be the best method to solve incomplete information extensive form games. In addition to RM and CFR, Fictitious Play…
Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization(CFR) has shown its success in Texas Hold'em poker. We apply this algorithm to another popular incomplete information game, Mahjong. Compared to the poker game, Mahjong is much more complex with many…
In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilibrium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for regret…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the most popular iterative algorithm for solving zero-sum imperfect-information games. Regret-Based Pruning (RBP) is an improvement that allows poorly-performing actions to be temporarily pruned,…
Monte-Carlo counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) is the state-of-the-art algorithm for solving sequential games that are too large for full tree traversals. It works by using gradient estimates that can be computed via sampling.…
Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on minimizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we derive a new framework for regret minimization on…
The CFR framework has been a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games in practice. However, the theoretical rate at which past CFR-based algorithms converge to the Nash equilibrium is on the order of $O(T^{-1/2})$, where…
Recent techniques for approximating Nash equilibria in very large games leverage neural networks to learn approximately optimal policies (strategies). One promising line of research uses neural networks to approximate counterfactual regret…
To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the…
A considerable chasm has been looming for decades between theory and practice in zero-sum game solving through first-order methods. Although a convergence rate of $T^{-1}$ has long been established, the most effective paradigm in practice…
Bayesian games model interactive decision-making where players have incomplete information -- e.g., regarding payoffs and private data on players' strategies and preferences -- and must actively reason and update their belief models (with…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms are widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games (IIGs). Among them, Predictive CFR$^+$ (PCFR$^+$) is particularly…
Function approximation is a powerful approach for structuring large decision problems that has facilitated great achievements in the areas of reinforcement learning and game playing. Regression counterfactual regret minimization (RCFR) is a…
Learning strategies for imperfect information games from samples of interaction is a challenging problem. A common method for this setting, Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MCCFR), can have slow long-term convergence rates…
The competition between radar and jammer is one emerging issue in modern electronic warfare, which in principle can be viewed as a non-cooperative game with two players. In this work, the competition between a frequency agile (FA) radar and…
High-quality information set abstraction remains a core challenge in solving large-scale imperfect-information extensive-form games (IIEFGs)--such as no-limit Texas Hold'em--where the finite nature of spatial resources hinders solving…