Related papers: Persuasive Selection in Signaling Games

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…

Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…

Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where rational entities interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance…

The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…

In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…

We study the computation of equilibria in prediction markets in perhaps the most fundamental special case with two players and three trading opportunities. To do so, we show equivalence of prediction market equilibria with those of a…

Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a…