Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
Theoretical Economics
2024-03-18 v2
Abstract
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2309.04193,
title = {Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives},
author = {Jan-Henrik Steg and Elshan Garashli and Michael Greinecker and Christoph Kuzmics},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.04193},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
32 pages, 5 figures