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In this paper, we extend the demographic eco-evolutionary game approach, based on explicit birth and death dynamics instead of abstract "fitness" interpreted as an abstract "Malthusian parameter", by the introduction of the delay resulting…

Human behavior is a dynamic process that evolves with experience. Understanding the evolution of individual's risk propensity is critical to design public health interventions to propitiate the adoption of better biosecurity protocols and…

Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest…

Costly punishment has been suggested as a key mechanism for stabilizing cooperation in one-shot games. However, recent studies have revealed that the effectiveness of costly punishment can be diminished by second-order free riders (i.e.,…

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…

Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…

Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players' strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces…

Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…

Games offer a compelling paradigm for developing general reasoning capabilities in language models, as they naturally demand strategic planning, probabilistic inference, and adaptive decision-making. However, existing self-play approaches…

Mating preferences of many biological species are not constant but season-dependent. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory this can be modeled with two finite opposite-sex populations playing against each other following the…

Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity are reputation models. These are games in which players base their decisions…

A stochastic model for behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals is developed. `Microscopic' assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations.…

We consider three distinct discrete-time models of learning and evolution in games: a biological model based on intra-species selective pressure, the dynamics induced by pairwise proportional imitation, and the exponential / multiplicative…

We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…

We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…

We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of…

Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…

One of the major benefits of belonging to a prestigious group is that it affects the way you are viewed by others. Here I use a simple mathematical model to explore the implications of this "prestige bias" when candidates undergo repeated…

We consider a preferential cluster growth in a one-dimensional stochastic model describing the dynamics of a binary chain with long-range memory. The model is driven by data corresponding to emotional patterns observed during online…

Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model in a dynamical directed network. We analytically obtain the degree distribution…