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In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed…
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…
In real-world social systems, individual interactions are frequently shaped by reputation, which not only influences partner selection but also affects the nature and benefits of the interactions themselves. We propose a heterogeneous game…
We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…
Demographic noise has profound effects on evolutionary and population dynamics, as well as on chemical reaction systems and models of epidemiology. Such noise is intrinsic and due to the discreteness of the dynamics in finite populations.…
Evolutionary game theory classically investigates which behavioral patterns are evolutionarily successful in a single game. More recently, a number of contributions have studied the evolution of preferences instead: which subjective…
Seniority runs deep. As the saying goes for some conventions or institutions in some societies, seniority exhibits and engulfs into almost all nooks and corners of their organisations. This paper presents an analysis of the conflict between…
We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains, which we model as different layers of a…
Recent work has revealed a new class of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies for iterated, two-player games. ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between her score and her opponent's score, and thus…
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…
We investigate further several properties of the minority game we have recently introduced. We explain the origin of the phase transition and give an analytical expression of $\sigma^2/N$ in the $N\ll2^M$ region. The ability of the players…
The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…
The occurrence of discrimination is an important problem in the social and economical sciences. Much of the discrimination observed in empirical studies can be explained by the theory of in-group favoritism, which states that people tend to…
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I…
What is intuitive: pro-social or anti-social behaviour? To answer this fundamental question, recent studies analyse decision times in game theory experiments under the assumption that intuitive decisions are fast and that deliberation is…
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential…
According to the standard imitation protocol, a less successful player adopts the strategy of the more successful one faithfully for future success. This is the cornerstone of evolutionary game theory that explores the vitality of competing…
The biased interaction game described the operation of systems rooted in boundedly rational interactions under conditions of scarcity. The game explored the influence of bias and demonstrated how hierarchy and inequality are emergent system…
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…