Related papers: Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…
Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system…
The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal."…
Empirical evidence suggests that even the most competitive markets are not strictly efficient. Price histories can be used to predict near future returns with a probability better than random chance. Many markets can be considered as {\it…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
We consider games played on graphs with the winning conditions for the players specified as weak-parity conditions. In weak-parity conditions the winner of a play is decided by looking into the set of states appearing in the play, rather…
Quantum entanglement is known to provide a strong advantage in many two-party distributed tasks. We investigate the question of how much entanglement is needed to reach optimal performance. For the first time we show that there exists a…
A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…
We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of…
Log-linear learning has been extensively studied in both the game theoretic and distributed control literature. It is appealing for many applications because it often guarantees that the agents' collective behavior will converge in…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
It is known that the memory is relevant in the symmetric phase of the minority game. In our previous work we have successfully explained the quasi-periodic behavior of the game in the symmetric phase with the help of the probability theory.…
Many studies have shown that humans are "predictably irrational": they do not act in a fully rational way, but their deviations from rational behavior are quite systematic. Our goal is to see the extent to which we can explain and justify…
We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
Applications of machine learning inform human decision makers in a broad range of tasks. The resulting problem is usually formulated in terms of a single decision maker. We argue that it should rather be described as a two-player learning…
We study the long-term behavior of the fictitious play process in repeated extensive-form games of imperfect information with perfect recall. Each player maintains incorrect beliefs that the moves at all information sets, except the one at…