Related papers: A Linear Programming Approach to Estimate the Core…
Computational equilibrium finding in large zero-sum extensive-form imperfect-information games has led to significant recent AI breakthroughs. The fastest algorithms for the problem are new forms of counterfactual regret minimization [Brown…
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic,…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
We consider the cooperative elements that arise in the design of public goods, such as transportation policies and infrastructure. These involve a variety of stakeholders: governments, businesses, advocates, and users. Their eventual…
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the…
The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…
Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…
We study the nucleolus in a class of cooperative games where agents collaborate by sharing demands and production-distribution capacities across multiple markets. These production-distribution games form a structured subclass of linear…
The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…
We design a linear time approximation scheme for the Gale-Berlekamp Switching Game and generalize it to a wider class of dense fragile minimization problems including the Nearest Codeword Problem (NCP) and Unique Games Problem. Further…
The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…
This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given $m$ random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the…
We present a general framework for matching with transferable utility (TU) that accommodates arbitrary heterogeneity without relying on the logit structure. The optimal assignment problem is characterized by tractable linear programming…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching…
We are concerned with the stability of a coalitional game, i.e., a transferable-utility (TU) cooperative game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings.…
Many important values for cooperative games are known to arise from least square optimization problems. The present investigation develops an optimization framework to explain and clarify this phenomenon in a general setting. The main…
The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility…