Related papers: A Novel Framework for Honey-X Deception in Zero-Su…

This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of…

Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

We study security threats to Markov games due to information asymmetry and misinformation. We consider an attacker player who can spread misinformation about its reward function to influence the robust victim player's behavior. Given a…

We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an…

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some…

We consider theoretical limits of partial secrecy in a setting where an eavesdropper attempts to causally reconstruct an information sequence with low distortion based on an intercepted transmission and the past of the sequence. The…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…

One of the widely used cyber deception techniques is decoying, where defenders create fictitious machines (i.e., honeypots) to lure attackers. Honeypots are deployed to entice attackers, but their effectiveness depends on their…

This paper resolves the open question of designing near-optimal algorithms for learning imperfect-information extensive-form games from bandit feedback. We present the first line of algorithms that require only…

Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is…

Consider a two-person zero-sum search game between a hider and a searcher. The hider hides among $n$ discrete locations, and the searcher successively visits individual locations until finding the hider. Known to both players, a search at…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…

We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds…

In online betting, the bookmaker can update the payoffs it offers on a particular event many times before the event takes place, and the updated payoffs may depend on the bets accumulated thus far. We study the problem of bookmaking with…

This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…