Related papers: Simple Communication
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
We investigate how asymmetric information affects equilibrium price formation in an economy with many interacting agents. Motivated by a finite-player model with two populations of asymmetrically informed agents, we study its mean-field…
Multi-agent systems (MAS) built on large language models (LLMs) often suffer from inefficient "free-for-all" communication, leading to exponential token costs and low signal-to-noise ratios that hinder their practical deployment. We…
Recent statistical approaches have improved the robustness and scalability of spoken dialogue systems. However, despite recent progress in domain adaptation, their reliance on in-domain data still limits their cross-domain scalability. In…
We study social learning from multiple experts whose precision is unknown and who care about reputation. The observer both learns a persistent state and ranks experts. In a binary baseline we characterize per-period equilibria: high types…
Communication requires having a common language, a lingua franca, between agents. This language could emerge via a consensus process, but it may require many generations of trial and error. Alternatively, the lingua franca can be given by…
The study of emergent communication has been dedicated to interactive artificial intelligence. While existing work focuses on communication about single objects or complex image scenes, we argue that communicating relationships between…
I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. The cost of running an experiment is the expected reduction of a weighted log-likelihood ratio function of the…
The usual semantics of multi-agent epistemic logic is based on Kripke models, defined in terms of binary relations on a set of possible worlds. Recently, there has been a growing interest in using simplicial complexes rather than graphs, as…
The way experts manage uncertainty usually changes depending on the task they are performing. This fact has lead us to consider the problem of communicating modules (task implementations) in a large and structured knowledge based system…
In markets with search frictions, consumers can acquire information about goods either through costly search or from friends via word-of-mouth (WOM) communication. How do sellers' market power react to a very large increase in the number of…
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with $\mathsf{SubAdd}\cup\mathsf{SingleM}$. We show that for…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…
Strategic learning studies how decision rules interact with agents who may strategically change their inputs/features to achieve better outcomes. In standard settings, models assume that the decision-maker's sole scope is to learn a…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized.…
A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…
A discourse strategy is a strategy for communicating with another agent. Designing effective dialogue systems requires designing agents that can choose among discourse strategies. We claim that the design of effective strategies must take…