Related papers: Simple Communication
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
While it is known that communication facilitates cooperation in multi-agent settings, it is unclear how to design artificial agents that can learn to effectively and efficiently communicate with each other. Much research on communication…
Languages vary widely in how meanings map to word forms. These mappings have been found to support efficient communication; however, this theory does not account for systematic relations within word forms. We examine how a restricted set of…
We conducted an empirical analysis into the relation between control and discourse structure. We applied control criteria to four dialogues and identified 3 levels of discourse structure. We investigated the mechanism for changing control…
Always, if the number of states is equal to two; or if the number of receiver actions is equal to two and i. The number of states is three or fewer, or ii. The game is cheap talk, or ii. There are just two available messages for the sender.…
Researchers are using deep learning models to explore the emergence of language in various language games, where agents interact and develop an emergent language to solve tasks. We focus on the factors that determine the expressivity of…
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…
This work studies distributed learning in the spirit of Yao's model of communication complexity: consider a two-party setting, where each of the players gets a list of labelled examples and they communicate in order to jointly perform some…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Scoring rules for eliciting expert predictions of random variables are usually developed assuming that experts derive utility only from the quality of their predictions (e.g., score awarded by the rule, or payoff in a prediction market). We…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
Explicit communication among humans is key to coordinating and learning. Social learning, which uses cues from experts, can greatly benefit from the usage of explicit communication to align heterogeneous policies, reduce sample complexity,…
Decentralized state estimation in a communication-constrained sensor network is considered. The exchanged estimates are dimension-reduced to reduce the communication load using a linear mapping to a lower-dimensional space. The mean squared…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
Value trade-offs are an integral part of human decision-making and language use, however, current tools for interpreting such dynamic and multi-faceted notions of values in language models are limited. In cognitive science, so-called…
Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…
Artificial agents have been shown to learn to communicate when needed to complete a cooperative task. Some level of language structure (e.g., compositionality) has been found in the learned communication protocols. This observed structure…
We study the dynamics of public opinion in a model in which agents change their opinions as a result of random binary encounters if the opinion difference is below their individual thresholds that evolve over time. We ground these…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
The established language for statistical testing --- significance levels, power, and p-values --- is overly complicated and deceptively conclusive. Even teachers of statistics and scientists who use statistics misinterpret the results of…