Related papers: Partitioned Combinatorial Optimization Games
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
The arboricity of a graph is the minimum number of forests required to cover all its edges. In this paper, we examine arboricity from a game-theoretic perspective and investigate cost-sharing in the minimum forest cover problem. We…
Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) are coalition-formation games where we are given a graph whose vertices represent $n$ selfish agents and the weight of each edge $uv$ denotes how much agent $u$ gains (or loses) when she is placed in…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…
We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the…
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…
This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given $m$ random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the…
Many economic games and machine learning approaches can be cast as competitive optimization problems where multiple agents are minimizing their respective objective function, which depends on all agents' actions. While gradient descent is a…
The Team Orienteering Problem (TOP) generalizes many real-world multi-robot scheduling and routing tasks that occur in autonomous mobility, aerial logistics, and surveillance applications. While many flavors of the TOP exist for planning in…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
This paper introduces a systematic methodological framework to design and analyze distributed algorithms for optimization and games over networks. Starting from a centralized method, we identify an aggregation function involving all the…
Combinatorial optimization is a fundamental problem found in many fields. In many real life situations, the constraints and the objective function forming the optimization problem are naturally distributed amongst different sites in some…
This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a group of agents, while maintaining stability in the sense of the core constraints of a cooperative transferable utility game, or TU game.…
The problem of generating an optimal coalition structure for a given coalition game of rational agents is to find a partition that maximizes their social welfare and is known to be NP-hard. This paper proposes GCS-Q, a novel…