Related papers: Truthful Two-Obnoxious-Facility Location Games wit…
Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. In the classical pure location Hotelling game businesses compete for maximizing…
We consider a facility location problem, where the objective is to ``disperse'' a number of facilities, i.e., select a given number k of locations from a discrete set of n candidates, such that the average distance between selected…
We provide nearly optimal algorithms for online facility location (OFL) with predictions. In OFL, $n$ demand points arrive in order and the algorithm must irrevocably assign each demand point to an open facility upon its arrival. The…
Approximating distance is one of the key challenge in a facility location problem. Several algorithms have been proposed, however, none of them focused on estimating distance between two concave regions. In this work, we present an…
The problem of analyzing the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior of selfish utility-maximizing agents has received much attention lately. Privacy concerns are often modeled by altering the utility functions of agents to consider also…
We investigate simple strategies that embody the decisions that one faces when trying to park near a popular destination. Should one park far from the target (destination), where finding a spot is easy, but then be faced with a long walk,…
We study a competitive facility location problem (CFLP), where two firms sequentially open new facilities within their budgets, in order to maximize their market shares of demand that follows a probabilistic choice model. This process is a…
Oblivious dimension reduction, \`{a} la the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) Lemma, is a fundamental approach for processing high-dimensional data. We study this approach for Uniform Facility Location (UFL) on a Euclidean input…
While single-agent policy optimization in a fixed environment has attracted a lot of research attention recently in the reinforcement learning community, much less is known theoretically when there are multiple agents playing in a…
We study the problem of online facility location with delay. In this problem, a sequence of $n$ clients appear in the metric space, and they need to be eventually connected to some open facility. The clients do not have to be connected…
We investigate {\em multidimensional covering mechanism-design} problems, wherein there are $m$ items that need to be covered and $n$ agents who provide covering objects, with each agent $i$ having a private cost for the covering objects he…
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…
This paper regards the problem of optimally placing unreliable sensors in a one-dimensional environment. We assume that sensors can fail with a certain probability and we minimize the expected maximum distance from any point in the…
We design a Copula-based generic randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling on two unrelated machines with approximation ratio within $[1.5852, 1.58606]$, offering an improved upper bound for the two-machine case. Moreover, we provide an…
We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently,…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
In this paper, we design user-centric obfuscation mechanisms that impose the minimum utility loss for guaranteeing user's privacy. We optimize utility subject to a joint guarantee of differential privacy (indistinguishability) and…
We consider an autonomous navigation problem, whereby a traveler aims at traversing an environment in which an adversary tries to set an ambush. A two players zero sum game is introduced. Players' strategies are computed as random path…