Related papers: A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…
Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But…
We apply the stabilizer formalism to the Maximum Cut problem, and obtain a new greedy construction heuristic. It turns out to be an elegant synthesis of the edge-contraction and differencing edge-contraction approaches. Utilizing the…
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…
We derive normal approximation results for a class of stabilizing functionals of binomial or Poisson point process, that are not necessarily expressible as sums of certain score functions. Our approach is based on a flexible notion of the…
A 2.75-approximation algorithm is proposed for the unconstrained traveling tournament problem, which is a variant of the traveling tournament problem. For the unconstrained traveling tournament problem, this is the first proposal of an…
To support a freight carrier in a combinatorial transport auction, we proposes an exact and two heuristic strategies for bidding on subsets of requests. The exact bidding strategy is based on the concept of elementary request combinations.…
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. In this paper, we cast the bilateral…
Consider a graph $G = (V, E)$ and some commuters, each specified by a tuple $(u, v, b)$ consisting of two nodes in the graph $u, v \in V$ and a non-negative real number $b$, specifying their budget. The goal is to find a pricing function…
We study the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) on the metric completion of cubic and subcubic graphs, which is known to be NP-hard. The problem is of interest because of its relation to the famous 4/3 conjecture for metric TSP, which says…
We study a natural combinatorial pricing problem for sequentially arriving buyers with equal budgets. Each buyer is interested in exactly one pair of items and purchases this pair if and only if, upon arrival, both items are still available…
The Foreign Exchange (Forex) is a large decentralized market, on which trading analysis and algorithmic trading are popular. Research efforts have been focusing on proof of efficiency of certain technical indicators. We demonstrate,…
In this work, we analyze two of the most fundamental algorithms in geodesically convex optimization: Riemannian gradient descent and (possibly inexact) Riemannian proximal point. We quantify their rates of convergence and produce different…
Motivated by applications in the gig economy, we study approximation algorithms for a \emph{sequential pricing problem}. The input is a bipartite graph $G=(I,J,E)$ between individuals $I$ and jobs $J$. The platform has a value of $v_j$ for…
We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight…
We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63\% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting-outperforming any other…
We combine the method of exchangeable pairs with Stein's method for functional approximation. As a result, we give a general linearity condition under which an abstract Gaussian approximation theorem for stochastic processes holds. We apply…
We study the Second Price Matching problem, introduced by Azar, Birnbaum, Karlin, and Nguyen in 2009. In this problem, a bipartite graph (bidders and goods) is given, and the profit of a matching is the number of matches containing a second…
We study repeated bilateral trade where an adaptive $\sigma$-smooth adversary generates the valuations of sellers and buyers. We provide a complete characterization of the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms under different feedback…