Related papers: A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
Two general algorithms based on opportunity costs are given for approximating a revenue-maximizing set of bids an auctioneer should accept, in a combinatorial auction in which each bidder offers a price for some subset of the available…
We consider an agent seeking to obtain an item, potentially available at different locations in a physical environment. The traveling costs between locations are known in advance, but there is only probabilistic knowledge regarding the…
We present a 4-approximation algorithm for the problem of placing a fewest guards on a 1.5D terrain so that every point of the terrain is seen by at least one guard. This improves on the currently best approximation factor of 5. Our method…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
The skewing mechanism of Azzalini for continuous distributions is used for the first time to derive a new generalization of the geometric distribution. Various structural properties of the proposed distribution are investigated.…
We explore two aspects of geometric approximation via a coupling approach to Stein's method. Firstly, we refine precision and increase scope for applications by convoluting the approximating geometric distribution with a simple translation…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, it extracts at least $\frac{1}{2.62}$-fraction of revenue;…
We present an algorithm for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem on instances which satisfy the triangle inequality. Like several existing algorithms, it achieves approximation ratio O(log n). Unlike previous algorithms, it uses…
This paper proposes a new one-sided matching market model in which every agent has a cost function that is allowed to take a negative value. Our model aims to capture the situation where some agents can profit by exchanging their obtained…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
We advance a recently flourishing line of work at the intersection of learning theory and computational economics by studying the learnability of two classes of mechanisms prominent in economics, namely menus of lotteries and two-part…
Prophet inequalities are a central object of study in optimal stopping theory. A gambler is sent values in an online fashion, sampled from an instance of independent distributions, in an adversarial, random or selected order, depending on…
Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…
Geometry constitutes a core set of intuitions present in all humans, regardless of their language or schooling [1]. Could brain's built in machinery for processing geometric information take part in uncertainty representation? For decades…
In this paper, we consider a one-dimensional random geometric graph process with the inter-nodal gaps evolving according to an exponential AR(1) process, which may serve as a mobile wireless network model. The transition probability matrix…
We study the statistical design of a fair mechanism that attains equalized odds, where an agent uses some useful data (database) $X$ to solve a task $T$. Since both $X$ and $T$ are correlated with some latent sensitive attribute $S$, the…
In this paper we test the random walk hypothesis on the high frequency dataset of the bid--ask Deutschemark/US dollar exchange rate quotes registered by the inter-bank Reuters network over the period October 1, 1992 to September 30, 1993.…
In this paper we consider the Recoverable Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). Here the task is to find two tours simultaneously, such that the intersection between the tours is at least a given minimum size, while the sum of travel distances…