Related papers: A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
Analyzing real data on international trade covering the time interval 1950-2000, we show that in each year over the analyzed period the network is a typical representative of the ensemble of maximally random weighted networks, whose…
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a given class. Most results in this literature focus on…
We study multi-item profit maximization when there is an underlying distribution over buyers' values. In practice, a full description of the distribution is typically unavailable, so we study the setting where the mechanism designer only…
A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. The first such mechanism was…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
We investigate the minimum cost of a wide class of combinatorial optimization problems over random bipartite geometric graphs in $\mathbb{R}^d$ where the edge cost between two points is given by a $p$-th power of their Euclidean distance.…
In the maximum traveling salesman problem (Max TSP) we are given a complete undirected graph with nonnegative weights on the edges and we wish to compute a traveling salesman tour of maximum weight. We present a fast combinatorial $\frac…
Weighted reciprocity between two agents can be defined as the minimum of sending and receiving value in their bilateral relationship. In financial networks, such reciprocity characterizes the importance of individual banks as both liquidity…
We investigate the pricing of financial options under the 2-hypergeometric stochastic volatility model. This is an analytically tractable model that reproduces the volatility smile and skew effects observed in empirical market data. Using a…
Picking sequences are well-established methods for allocating indivisible goods. Among the various picking sequences, recursively balanced picking sequences -- whereby each agent picks one good in every round -- are notable for guaranteeing…
Consider the following social choice problem. Suppose we have a set of $n$ voters and $m$ candidates that lie in a metric space. The goal is to design a mechanism to choose a candidate whose average distance to the voters is as small as…
Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the private values case. In this paper, we study welfare maximization…
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright [2001]. This auction has been analyzed by Feige, Flaxman, Hartline, and Kleinberg [2005], who have…
We study the social efficiency of bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer. In the classical Bayesian setting, the celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states that no Bayesian incentive-compatible, individually…
Users can now give back energies to the grid using distributed resources. Proper incentive mechanisms are required for such users, also known as prosumers, in order to maximize the sell-back amount while maintaining the retailer's profit.…
Motivated by applications in online dating and kidney exchange, the stochastic matching problem was introduced by Chen, Immorlica, Karlin, Mahdian and Rudra (2009). They have proven a 4-approximation of a simple greedy strategy, but…
Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are…
Let $G$ be a graph in which each vertex initially has weight 1. In each step, the weight from a vertex $u$ to a neighbouring vertex $v$ can be moved, provided that the weight on $v$ is at least as large as the weight on $u$. The total…
We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The…