Related papers: Achieving Irrational Correlated Equilibria without…
A correlated equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory that enjoys many desirable properties. However, it requires a trusted mediator, which is a major drawback in many practical applications. A computational solution to…
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
Achieving seamless coordination in cooperative games is a crucial challenge in artificial intelligence, particularly when players operate under incomplete information. While communication helps, it is not always feasible. In this paper, we…
In this work we apply methods from cryptography to enable any number of mutually distrusting players to implement broad classes of mediated equilibria of strategic games without the need for trusted mediation. Our implementation makes use…
There is currently an intersection in the research of game theory and cryptography. Generally speaking, there are two aspects to this partnership. First there is the application of game theory to cryptography. Yet, the purpose of this paper…
Effective multi-robot teams require the ability to move to goals in complex environments in order to address real-world applications such as search and rescue. Multi-robot teams should be able to operate in a completely decentralized…
In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which a mediation…
This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
We consider $k$-resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most $k$ players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all $k$-resilient…
We propose a method, based on empirical game theory, for a robot operating as part of a team to choose its role within the team without explicitly communicating with team members, by leveraging its knowledge about the team structure. To do…
We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…
This paper analyzes the information disclosure problems originated in economics through the lens of information theory. Such problems are radically different from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since they…
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' or 'lose'. We identify and discuss a range of 'purely rational principles' guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and…
Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energy-efficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through…
We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We…
Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…