Related papers: Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependen…
We consider the problem of repeatedly allocating multiple shareable public goods that have limited availability in an online setting without the use of money. In our setting, agents have additive values, and the value each agent receives…
In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize in order to maximize their utilities. A number of results…
In an online fair allocation problem, a sequence of indivisible items arrives online and needs to be allocated to offline agents immediately and irrevocably. In our paper, we study the online allocation of either goods or chores. We employ…
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an…
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length $n$, are decided in an adversarial, online…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning systems, the actions of one agent can have a negative impact on the rewards of other agents. One way to combat this problem is to let agents trade their rewards amongst each other. Motivated by this,…
In the secretary problem we are faced with an online sequence of elements with values. Upon seeing an element we have to make an irrevocable take-it-or-leave-it decision. The goal is to maximize the probability of picking the element of…
In the Submodular Welfare Maximization (SWM) problem, the input consists of a set of $n$ items, each of which must be allocated to one of $m$ agents. Each agent $\ell$ has a valuation function $v_\ell$, where $v_\ell(S)$ denotes the welfare…
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent…
In many multiagent domains a set of agents exert effort towards a joint outcome, yet the individual effort levels cannot be easily observed. A typical example for such a scenario is routing in communication networks, where the sender can…
Contract theory studies how a principal can incentivize agents to exert costly, unobservable effort through performance-based payments. While classical economic models provide elegant characterizations of optimal solutions, modern…
For a binary choice problem, the spatial coordination of decisions in an agent community is investigated both analytically and by means of stochastic computer simulations. The individual decisions are based on different local information…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents, where each agent's valuation is fractionally subadditive (XOS). With respect to AnyPrice Share (APS) fairness, Kulkarni et al. (2024) showed that, when agents have…
We study contextual search, a generalization of binary search in higher dimensions, which captures settings such as feature-based dynamic pricing. Standard formulations of this problem assume that agents act in accordance with a specific…
This paper models the cyber-social system as a cyber-network of agents monitoring states of individuals in a social network. The state of each individual is represented by a social node and the interactions among individuals are represented…
While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among…
We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not common…
We study the matroid secretary problems with submodular valuation functions. In these problems, the elements arrive in random order. When one element arrives, we have to make an immediate and irrevocable decision on whether to accept it or…
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an…
Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…