Related papers: Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependen…
The value maximization version of the secretary problem is the problem of hiring a candidate with the largest value from a randomly ordered sequence of candidates. In this work, we consider a setting where predictions of candidate values…
We study a general online combinatorial auction problem in algorithmic mechanism design. A provider allocates multiple types of capacity-limited resources to customers that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each customer has a…
We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit…
We initiate the study of online contracts, which integrate the game-theoretic considerations of economic contract theory, with the algorithmic and informational challenges of online algorithm design. Our starting point is the classic online…
In the online random-arrival model, an algorithm receives a sequence of n requests that arrive in a random order. The algorithm is expected to make an irrevocable decision with regard to each request based only on the observed history. We…
The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stopping Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items because of their applications in mechanism design. The most…
For many online problems, it is known that the uniform arrival order enables the design of algorithms with much better performance guarantees than under worst-case. The quintessential example is the secretary problem. If the sequence of…
Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, complements are common in the standard motivating applications…
We study an online fair division setting, where goods arrive one at a time and there is a fixed set of $n$ agents, each of whom has an additive valuation function over the goods. Once a good appears, the value each agent has for it is…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
Cyber defense operations increasingly require long-term strategic planning under uncertainty and resource constraints. We propose a new use of combinatorial auctions for allocating defensive action bundles in a realistic cyber environment,…
We consider the single-item interdependent value setting, where there is a monopolist, $n$ buyers, and each buyer has a private signal $s_i$ describing a piece of information about the item. Each bidder $i$ also has a valuation function…
We study auction design within the widely acclaimed model of interdependent values, introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982]. In this model, every bidder $i$ has a private signal $s_i$ for the item for sale, and a public valuation function…
We consider online procurement auctions, where the agents arrive sequentially, in random order, and have private costs for their services. The buyer aims to maximize a monotone submodular value function for the subset of agents whose…
The Matroid Secretary Problem is a central question in online optimization, modeling sequential decision-making under combinatorial constraints. We introduce a bipartite graph framework that unifies and extends several known formulations,…
We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions $v_1(\cdot)$ and $v_2(\cdot)$ over subsets of $m$ items, and their goal is to partition the items into $S, \bar{S}$ in a way that maximizes…
We study the necessity of interaction for obtaining efficient allocations in subadditive combinatorial auctions. This problem was originally introduced by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Oren (STOC'14) as the following simple market scenario: $m$…
Suppose that $n$ items arrive online in random order and the goal is to select $k$ of them such that the expected sum of the selected items is maximized. The decision for any item is irrevocable and must be made on arrival without knowing…
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line…
A combinatorial market consists of a set of indivisible items and a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation function that specifies for each subset of items its value for the given agent. From an optimization point of view, the goal…