While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among multiple bidders managed by a third-party bidding agent, and strategic bid selection for multiple ad campaigns managed by a single advertiser. We formalize this coordination problem as a theoretical model and investigate the coordination mechanism where only the highest-value bidder competes with outside bidders, while other coordinated bidders refrain from competing. We demonstrate that such a coordination mechanism dominates independent bidding, improving both Return-on-Spend (RoS) compliance and the total value accrued for the participating auto-bidders or ad campaigns, for a broad class of auto-bidding algorithms. Additionally, our simulations on synthetic and real-world datasets support the theoretical result that coordination outperforms independent bidding. These findings highlight both the theoretical potential and the practical robustness of coordinated auto-bidding in online auctions.
@article{arxiv.2511.04993,
title = {On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders},
author = {Yanru Guan and Jiahao Zhang and Zhe Feng and Tao Lin},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.04993},
year = {2026}
}